Are voters competent (enough)?

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LSE

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This session: People make mistakes.

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Two parts:

- Behavioral public policy (including "nudge")
- Assessments of voter competence

Behavioral public policy

Behavioral politics

Concerns about voter competence Defenses of democracy Some reassuring evidence

Conclusion

Rational choice theory

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Anything else is misguided paternalism.

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How do we resolve info asymmetries when there is no "neutral" way to provide information? Should we try to help people avoid bad decisions?

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Sunstein (L) and Thaler (R); photo from time.com

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Basic idea: Recognize people make some bad choices. Design policies that preserve choice but use framing and defaults to "nudge" people toward decisions that benefit them.

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Examples:

- Smarter defaults for employee savings plans
- Requiring credit card companies to issue detailed end-of-year statements detailing fees
- Gambling "self-bans"

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Contradiction?

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Some evidence:

- Healy and Malhotra (2009) show that U.S. voters reward politicians for disaster *relief* spending but not for disaster *preparedness* spending (even though disaster preparedness spending is much more effective)
- Some view increasing size of government over time as a problem of self-control; rational or irrational myopia

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Recency bias:

- Achen & Bartels (2004): U.S. pres. election results depend on very recent economic performance; voters ignore earlier performance (political business cycle)
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But: partisanship strongly affects economic perceptions. (Healy & Malhotra (2013) for U.S.; Evans & Andersen (2006) for U.K.)

Ignorant voters

Many studies show that most voters don't know

- how well the economy is doing
- what is in the budget (e.g. proportion of budget devoted to foreign aid)
- the names of any but the most high-profile politicians
- what the right policies are (Caplan, 2007)

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Implication: If voters have self-control problems, they may vote to implement policies to address those problems (e.g. public pension system, Behavioural Insights Team)

* See Kahneman 2011, Thinking, Fast and Slow

Representation

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The insulated professionals (politicians, interest groups, lobbyists) who actually make policy are more informed and may be more forward-looking (e.g. Jacobs' (2011) study of public pension systems.)

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Retrospective voting as modest defense of democracy.

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How high does the correlation need to be?


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Condorcet jury theorem says: "not very high", if the electorate is large.

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Marquis de Condorcet; photo from Wikipedia

 \implies voters don't even have to be that accurate!

Applying ideas from the math pre-fresher:


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Number of voters

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Aggregation (4)
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For discussion:

- How much does the Condorcet jury theorem reassure you about democracy?
- What is missing from the model?

Economic voting & benchmarking

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1990

1995

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- But: Kayser & Peress (2012) show that OECD voters reward incumbent more for "benchmarked" national growth than for raw national growth

Kayser & Peress (2012) Fig. 2: Magnitude of the Benchmarked (dotted line) and Non-benchmarked (solid line) Economic Vote over Time (10 year window)

2000


Window End


2005

2010

Economic voting & partisanshop

- Many studies show disengagement of voters from politics: membership in parties declining, dropping turnout, lower identification with parties
- But: Kayser & Wlezien (2011) show that voters are more responsive to economic performance when they have weaker partisan attachments





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Wrapping up

Key points:

- Citizens' limitations imply a role for policy ("nudges"), but also cast doubt on the effectiveness of democracy in providing incentives for good policy
- Growing evidence at individual and aggregate level of voters' limitations: myopic, arbitrary, biased, ignorant
- Retrospective voting may produce surprisingly good incentives aggregation of (independent) assessments that are weakly correlated with effort/quality of leadership could be "enough"
- ► There is also evidence of (aggregate) voter competence