

GV478: Political Science and Public Policy (LT 2014)

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Instructor: Dr. Andrew Eggers
Lent Term 2013

Lecture Room

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This is the reading list for the continuation of GV478. For your convenience, I have included the “Content”, “Course structure”, “Assessment”, and “anti-plagiarism policy” sections from the reading list distributed at the beginning of the MT. The rest is new.

Content

In this course we develop tools to analyse important political phenomena including elections, legislative bargaining, coalitions, lobbying, bureaucracy and international relations. We focus on game theory as a way of understanding strategic interactions among political actors within different institutional arrangements. Students will learn basic game theoretical concepts and apply them to a variety of political contexts; these tools should be useful both for explaining existing political outcomes and for designing interventions to achieve desired future outcomes.

Course structure

The course consists of a weekly 2 hour lecture/revision session and a 1.5 hour seminar/application session. The lectures cover key theories, which will be revisited and discussed in the seminars. In lectures the lecturer will present the material. The seminar is an opportunity for students to lead the discussion, ask questions and gain a deeper understanding of the material covered in the lecture. It is thus essential that all students read the two core readings for that week (core readings are indicated with an asterisk) not only prior to the seminar but also prior to the lecture. Seminars will seek an active participation of students: you might correct game theory exercises on the board, present a couple of papers included in the weeks reading and/or guide a discussion on the weeks topic.

In weeks 5, 10, 15 and 20 the lecture slots will be used as voluntary support sessions in which the lecturer will respond to any question or doubts students may have about the material covered in the previous four weeks. Seminar time during these weeks will be used for our applications sessions. These applications look at situations in which students can apply the topics covered in the previous four weeks to specific real world political and public policy problems. There will be two revision sessions in the summer term.

Assessment

The overall mark for the course is set by three elements:

First, there is a three hour unseen exam that accounts for 60% of the final mark. The exam will be taken in June and will be based on topics covered in lectures (not the applications). There will be three parts in the exam: (1) a compulsory game theory/short answer section; (2) one essay question from the material taught in the Michaelmas Term; (3) one essay question from the material taught in the Lent Term.

Second, there is an essay of 2,000 words that accounts for 20% of the final mark. The deadline for submission of the essay is on the first Thursday of the Summer Term (Thursday 2nd May 2013). The word count for the essay includes footnotes and appendices but excludes references. Students will choose the topic of their essay: any politics or policy topic is acceptable, and students have considerable autonomy regarding the substantive issue they want to explore in the essay. Students should keep in mind that their argument should take the material taught in the lectures into consideration. In previous years there have been two clear strategies for choosing the topic: (1) consider a theoretical / empirical argument explained in the lectures and try to apply it to a different situation (it could be an application to a different policy area, a different region, etc); (2) consider two seemingly unrelated topics from the lectures and make an effort to build bridges to see how the two views complement/contradict each other. Important elements in the assessed essays are students own insights/critical assessment on the topic. Students are not encouraged to select a question from a previous exam: an exam answer is usually shorter than 2,500 words and determines whether the course material has been understood. Instead, in an assessed essay students may access many resources and can use the material/concepts from the lectures to analyze the topic that interests them most.

Third, there are four applications exercises that together account for 20% of the final mark. These applications will be carried out in groups, and will be assessed by their presentation. Each seminar will be divided into three groups in weeks 12 and 17. This will give each group 3 weeks to plan and implement their presentation. Each application has a set of readings designed to prompt the students in answering the question set. However, students are encouraged to bring in other materials relevant to that question. Each application group must present their topic in strictly no more than 20 minutes, and upload the slides on Moodle during the week of the presentation (all members of the group should be listed on the first slide). Assessment is primarily as a group work but there may also be an individual component within the mark.

Anti-plagiarism policy

The LSE has strictly enforced rules against any unacknowledged quotation of other peoples work or previously submitted work. All such passages can attract penalties, including zero marks in blatant circumstances where work is extensively copied. Essays are checked electronically against software designed to identify any copied passages. Please be very careful in making notes electronically and attributing sources and write all materials in assessed

essays in your own words. The MPA Handbook has more details of the policies that operate here. Please read carefully the section on self-plagiarism!

Week 11. Externalities in Policymaking

LECTURE ON 17 JANUARY; CLASSES ON 21-23 JANUARY

Goals

- Apply the ideas of public goods and externalities (which provide a rationale for government intervention in the economy) to budgeting and other forms of government activity
- Understand the role of political institutions in creating or addressing these problems

Reading

*Shepsle (2010), “Public goods, externalities, and commons”, chapter 10 of *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions*.

*von Hagen (2006), “Political economy of fiscal institutions,” chapter 26 of *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*.

Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981), “The political economy of benefits and costs: A neo-classical approach to distributive politics”, *Journal of Political Economy*, vol 89, no. 4, pp 642–664.

Persson and Tabellini (2000), “Public debt”, chapter 13 of *Political Economics*.

Von Hagen and Harden (1995), “Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline” *European Economic Review* Vol 39, 771-779.

Week 12. Externalities in lobbying and advocacy

LECTURE ON 24 JANUARY; CLASSES ON 28-30 JANUARY

Goals

- Understand the obstacles to collective action, and means of surmounting those challenges, as conceived by Olson
- Apply these ideas to areas of public policy

Reading

Concepts/theory:

*Olson, Mancur (1982), “The Logic”, chapter 2 of *The Rise and Decline of Nations*. [This chapter is a summary of Olson’s *The Logic of Collective Action*, 1965. – æ]

*Shepsle (2010), “Cooperation” and “Collective Action”, chapters 8 & 9 of *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions*.

Elster, Jon (1989), esp. Chapter 1 of *The Cement of Society*.

Empirical papers:

Gawande, Krishna, and Olarreaga (2009), “What Governments Maximize and Why: The View From Trade”, *International Organization*, pp. 491-532.

Bombardini and Trebbi (2012), “Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy?”, *Journal of International Economics*, 87 (1), pp. 18-26.

Hansen, Wendy L. et al (2005), “The Logic of Private and Collective Action”, *American Journal of Political Science*, 49 (1), pp. 150–167.

On repeated games and reciprocity:

Bó, Pedro Dal, “Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games”, *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 95 No. 5., 2005, p. 1591 - 1604.

Putnam, Robert, “Social Capital and Institutional Success”, chap. 6 of *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 163-185.

Week 13. Lobbying and political finance

LECTURE ON 31 JANUARY; CLASSES ON 4-6 FEBRUARY

Goals

- Appreciate the variation across systems in how money is regulated and used
- Think systematically about determinants of spending on politics, including the regulations politicians choose

Reading

*Pinto-Duschinsky (2002), “Financing Politics: A Global View”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 69-86.

*Ansolabehere et al (2003), “Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 105-130.

*Hall and Deardorff (2006), “Lobbying as legislative subsidy”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 69-84.

Grant (2005), “Party and Election Finance in Britain and America: A Comparative Analysis”, *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 71-88.

Ben Clift and Justin Fisher (2004), “Comparative Party Finance Reform: The Cases of France and Britain”, *Party Politics*, 10:6, pp. 677-699.

M. V. Rajeev Gowda and E. Sridharan (2012), “Reforming India’s Party Financing and Election Expenditure Laws”, *Election Law Journal*, 11:2, pp. 226–240.

David J. Samuels (2002), “Pork Barreling Is Not Credit Claiming or Advertising: Campaign Finance and the Sources of the Personal Vote in Brazil” *The Journal of Politics*, 64:3, pp. 845-863.

Carey and Shugart (1994), “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas”, *Electoral Studies*, 14:4, pp. 417-439.

Andrew C. Eggers and Jens Hainmueller (2009), “MPs For Sale?” *American Political Science Review*, 103:4, pp. 1–21.

Timothy Besley (2004), “Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence”, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2:2/3, pp. 193–215.

Abrams and Settle (1978), “The economic theory of regulation and public financing of presidential elections”, *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 86, No. 2, pp. 245-257.

Bleching (2000), “Cleaning up politics and revitalizing democracy? A European view of the new system of political finance in Japan”, *European Review*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 533-551.

Week 15: Applications I

PRESENTATIONS ON 12-14 FEBRUARY

Application topic 1: Government Transparency

Activists and reform-minded politicians in many countries have advocated increased government transparency (i.e. measures that make it easier for the public to learn about the actions of government agencies and elected officials) as a way of improving government performance. Choose a transparency reform (or a set of reforms) that has been adopted in the last few decades or is being considered currently. What sorts of effects might we expect from the reform(s)? How can/could we tell whether those effects indeed occur? *(Please stay away from the issue of lobbying to leave room for your classmates assigned to topic 3.)*

Suggested readings

- Bertot, John C., Paul T. Jaeger, and Justin M. Grimes (2010), “Using ICTs to create a culture of transparency: E-government and social media as openness and anti-corruption tools for societies”, *Government Information Quarterly*, Vol. 27, pp. 264–271.
- Jenkins, Rob and Anne Marie Goetz (1999), “Accounts and accountability: theoretical implications of the right-to-information movement in India”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 603–622.
- Lollar, Xia Li (2006), “Assessing China’s E-Government: information, service, transparency and citizen outreach of government websites,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, 15:46, pp. 31–41.
- Frost, Amanda (2003), “Restoring Faith in Government: Transparency Reform in the United States and the European Union”, *European Public Law*, Vol. 9, Issue 1, pp. 87–104.
- Florini, Ann (editor), (2007), *The Right to Know: Transparency for an Open World*, Columbia University Press.
- Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess (2002), “The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Nov. pp. 1415–1451.
- Alt, James and David Dreyer Lassen (2006), “Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries”, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 530-550.
- Lessig, Lawrence. “Against Transparency”. *The New Republic*, October 9, 2009.
- Swartz, Aaron “Disinfecting the Sunlight Foundation” and “Transparency is Bunk”

Application topic 2: Decentralization

Decentralization reforms have been adopted by most developing countries in recent decades, partly responding to advice from international institutions. Suppose you were asked by an international institution to give an assessment of the effectiveness of decentralization (political, fiscal and/or administrative) as a method of making government spending more effective and less corrupt. (The best approach may be to use one or two case studies to highlight the general lessons of broader research.)

Suggested readings

- Rodden, Jonathan (2004), “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement”, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 481-500.
- Daughters, Robert and Leslie Harper, (2007), “Fiscal and Political Decentralization Reforms”, Chapter 7 of *The State of State Reform in Latin America*, ed. Eduardo Lora, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Crook, R.C. and J. Manor (1998), *Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance*, Cambridge University Press.
- Olowu, Dele, and James S. Wunsch (2004), *Local Governance in Africa: The Challenges of Democratic Decentralization*.
- Agrawal, Arun and Jesse Ribot, (1999), “Accountability in Decentralization: A Framework with South Asian and West African Cases”, *Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 473-502.
- Heller, Patrick, (2001), “Moving the State: The Politics of Democratic Decentralization in Kerala, South Africa, and Porto Alegre”, *Politics and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 131–163.

Application topic 3: Lobbying and the EU

You are an adviser to an MEP. In light of the recent allegations of improper lobbying behavior (which led to the resignation of EU Health Commissioner John Galli), the MEP wants to know what lobbying reforms should be adopted that would help “put people first”. Reviewing the regulations on lobbying in the European Parliament and European Commission, what reforms do you think the MEP should consider? Be sure to make clear the possible public policy implications of the reforms you address.

Suggested readings

- *Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, Actors, and Issues*, (2009), edited by David Coen and Jeremy Richardson
- S. Hix and B. Hoyland (2011), Chapter 7 (“Interest Representation”) of *The Political System of the European Union*, 3rd edn, London: Palgrave.
- Chari, Raj, Gary Murphy, and John Hogan (2007), “Regulating Lobbyists: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, Canada, Germany, and the European Union”, *The Political Quarterly*, Vol, 78, No. 3, pp. 422–438.
- McLaughlin, Andrew and Justin Greenwood (1995), “The Management of Interest Representation in the European Union”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 143–156.
- Dur, Andreas (2008), “Interest Groups in the European Union: How Powerful Are They?”, *West European Politics*, 31:6, 1212-1230.
- Woll, Cornelia (2012), “The brash and the soft-spoken: Lobbying styles in a transatlantic comparison”, *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, 1: 193-214.
- D. Coen (ed.) (2007) “Empirical and Theoretical Studies of EU Lobbying”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 14(3) (special issue), in particular articles by Broschied & Coen, Beyers & Kerremans and Eising.
- OECD (2010), “Post-Public Employment: Good Practices for Preventing Conflict of Interest”.
- Materials on the ALTER-EU and Corporate Europe Observatory websites

Week 16. Coordination: constitutions and revolutions

LECTURE ON 22 FEBRUARY, CLASSES ON 26-28 FEBRUARY

Goals

- Understand the idea of coordination games
- Apply logic of coordination games to understand Weingast's model of the rule of law and Kuran analysis of revolutions

Reading

*Weingast (1997), "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law", *American Political Science Review*, pg 245.

*Kuran, T. (1991), "Now out of never: The element of surprise in the East European revolution of 1989," *World Politics*, pp. 7- 48.

Kern, H. and Hainmueller, J. (2009), "Opium for the Masses: How Foreign Media Can Stabilize Authoritarian Regimes." *Political Analysis* 17: 377399.

Welzel and Inglehart (2009), "Political Culture, Mass Beliefs, and Value Change", Chapter 9 in Haerpfer, C., ed, *Democratization*, Oxford University Press.

Przeworski, A. (1991), "Transitions to Democracy", chapter 2 of *Democracy and the Market*.

Granovetter, M. (1978), "Threshold models of collective behavior", *American Journal of Sociology* 83: 1420-1443.

Ahlquist and Levi (2011), "Leadership: What it means, what it does, and what we want to know about it", *Annual Review of Political Science* 14: 1-21.

Week 17. Commitment: Threats and promises, wars and parliaments

LECTURE ON 1 MARCH, CLASSES ON 5-7 MARCH

Goals

- Understand why players may want to restrict their possible actions (i.e. commit)
- Examine examples of commitment problems and commitment devices in political settings

Reading

*Dixit and Nalebuff (1991), “Strategic Moves” chapter 5 of *Thinking strategically: The competitive edge in business, politics, and everyday life*.

*Dixit and Nalebuff (2010), “Making Strategies Credible” chapter 7 of *The Art of Strategy: A Game Theorist’s Guide to Success in Business and Life*

*Fearon, J. (1995), “Rationalist Explanations for War”, *International Organization*, 49:3, pp. 379-414. [*Focus on the setup and the section on commitment problems.*]

*Frieden, J., Lake, D., and Schultz, K. (2010), “Why Are There Wars?”, chapter 3 in *World Politics: Interests, Interactions, and Institutions*, pp. 83-125. [*This is a less academic statement of the ideas in the Fearon article. Again, focus on the setup and the section on commitment problems.*]

Nalepa, M. (2010), “Captured Commitments”, *World Politics*, Vol. 62: pp 341-380.

Stasavage (2002), “Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited”, *Journal of Law Economics and Organization*, Vol. 18, pg. 155.

North and Weingast, (1989), “Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England”, *Journal of Economic History*, vol 49, number 4, pp. 803-32.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), “Why did the West extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Nov., pp. 1167-1199.

Week 18. Signaling: actions as messages

LECTURE ON 8 MARCH, CLASSES ON 12-14 MARCH

Goals

- Understand how some otherwise-puzzling actions may make sense as signals
- Apply this insight to analyses of treaty signing, lobbying, demonstrations, and other political phenomena.

Reading

*Hollyer and Rosendorff (2011), “Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics and Non-Compliance”, *Quarterly Journal Political Science*, Vol. 6, pp. 275-327.

*Lohmann, S. (1994), “The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: the Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-1991.” *World Politics* 47: 42–101.

*Gordon and Hafer (2005), “Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99, No. 2, pp. 245-261.

Lohmann (1993), “A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 2, pp. 319-333.

Gintis, Smith, and Bowles (2001), “Costly Signaling and Cooperation”, *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, Vol. 213, pp. 103-119.

Week 19. International relations: agreeing and disagreeing in an anarchic world

LECTURE ON 15 MARCH (NO CLASSES)

Goals

Apply the ideas of the previous several weeks to the questions,

- “What does international law accomplish?”
- “How can conflicts be prevented and resolved?”

Reading

*Simmons, B (2010), “Treaty Compliance and Violation”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13: 273-296.

*Martin, Lisa, (1999), “The Political Economy of International Cooperation,” pp. 51-64 in *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century*, Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, eds. Oxford: UNDP.

*Kydd, Andrew (2010). “Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Resolution”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 13, pp. 101-121.

*Walter, Barbara (2009). “Bargaining Failures and Civil War”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 12, pp. 243-261.

Simmons, B., (2000), “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs”, *American Political Science Review*, pg 819.

Hathaway, O (2002), “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” *Yale Law Journal*.

Tomz, M (2008), “Reputation and the Effect of International Law on Preferences and Beliefs” (working paper).

Week 20 Application

PRESENTATIONS ON 19-21 MARCH

Application topic 1: Fiscal Compact

European leaders recently agreed to a “fiscal compact” that would impose automatic sanctions on EU member states that breach deficit limits.

What problem is the fiscal pact intended to solve? Will it succeed? Are there other reforms that would work better?

Suggested reading

- Text of the treaty
- Background and analysis of Stability and Growth Pact – the fiscal compact’s predecessor
 - Schuknecht et al (2011), “The Stability and Growth Pact: Crisis and Reform”, European Central Bank Occasional Paper Series, No. 129.
 - Eichengreen, B. (2004), “Institutions for Fiscal Stability,” *CESifo Economic Studies*, Vol. 50, pp. 1-25.
- Empirical studies of fiscal rules and budget procedures adopted by governments
 - Debrun et al (2008), “Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union”. *Economic Policy*, pp. 299–362.
 - Bonn, H. and Inman, R. (1996), “Balanced-budget rules and public deficits: evidence from the U.S. states”, *Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy* 45, pp. 13–76.
 - Hallerberg et al (2007), “The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries”, *European Journal of Political Economy* 23, pp. 338–359.
- Tilford, S., and Whyte, P. (2011), “Why stricter rules threaten the eurozone”, Center for European Reform.

Application topic 2: Sovereign Debt Crisis

In March of 2012, Greece announced the largest sovereign debt restructuring in history. Although the Greek debt crisis has attracted the most attention, the high sovereign debt burdens of other countries in Europe and elsewhere cause concern and speculation that there will be defaults or restructurings in other countries.

Your task in this application module is to provide a background briefing on the sovereign debt crisis to a policymaker. The three questions the policymaker has asked you are:

- Where did all of this debt come from, and who holds it?
- If countries can restructure their debt, why do they ever bother paying the full amount?
- In a restructuring, what determines how much a government has to pay?

You may choose to focus on Greece or another country or speak more broadly about sovereign debt issues in various countries.

Readings

- Rogoff and Reinhart (2009), “A Digression on the Theoretical Underpinnings of Debt Crises,” in *This Time It’s Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly*
- Tomz (2007), *Reputation and international cooperation: sovereign debt across three centuries*, Princeton University Press. (Available as time-limited download from LSE library.)
- Long, but containing useful insight about the interaction between domestic politics and debt negotiations:
 - Putnam (1988), “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games”, *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 427–460.
 - Lehman and McCoy (1992), “The dynamics of the two-level bargaining game: The 1988 Brazilian debt negotiations”, *World Politics*, Vol. 44, pp. 600–644.
- Analysis of the eurozone crisis, including role of debt (just a few of the many useful things being written):
 - Boone, P., and Johnson, S. (2011), “Europe on the brink”, Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief Number PB11-13.
 - Tilford, S., and Whyte, P. (2011), “Why stricter rules threaten the eurozone”, Center for European Reform.
 - Carlin, W. (2011), “10 questions about the eurozone crisis and whether it can be solved”, UCL European Institute.

Application topic 3: NGO Case Study

As a group, choose an NGO (i.e. a private organization) or set of NGOs, and present a case study of this NGO that highlights some or all of the following:

- **Mission:** Does the NGO address any of the “canonical” problems we have studied (e.g. principal-agent problems in government or elsewhere, asymmetric information in market exchange, common pool resources, public goods provision, problems of cooperation, coordination, or commitment)? How, specifically? Is it effective?
- **Organization:** How does the NGO address collective action problems – in its organization and perhaps in its mission?
- **Relationship to the public institutions:** Are the NGO’s activities a complement or substitute to the activities of the state or international organizations? Could/should the NGO’s activities be undertaken by the state or international organizations?

You may in addition choose to play consultant, either recommending steps that should be taken by the NGO, the state, or other actors, or making projections about what may happen in the future in the NGO’s environment.

Success in this module will depend on your ability to discuss the NGO you have chosen using the language of the course. This will depend in part on your choice of an NGO. An NGO that receives grants from the Gates Foundation to distribute malaria nets can be described in terms of positive externalities and collective action problems, but neither this mission (nets) nor this method of solving collective action problems (grants) is very interesting. Look for an NGO whose activities make more sense when one applies concepts from the course. And be sure not to spend too much time describing the NGO’s work – by now you realize we much prefer analysis to description.

Readings

Most of your research will involve learning about the NGO you have chosen. For some NGOs it will be possible to learn from a website about the NGO’s mission, history, funding, organization, etc; for others, you may need to arrange interviews or exchange emails with NGO staff. For this reason you should begin research early to make sure that you can obtain the information you need for your presentation.

Additional readings that might be useful or suggest further readings:

- (From week 16) Baron, D. (2002). “Private ordering on the internet: the eBay community of traders”, *Business and Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 3. pp. 245–264. (*Provides a model of the kind of analysis you should aim to present.*)
- (From week 19) Martin, L. (1999). “The Political Economy of International Cooperation,” pp. 51–64 in *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century*, Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, eds. Oxford: UNDP, 1999. (*Discusses the role of NGOs in relation to international institutions and international cooperation.*)
- Gemmill, B. and Bamidele-Izu, A. (2002). “The role of NGOs and civil society in global environmental governance”, *Global Environmental Governance: Options & Opportunities*, vol. 77, pp. 1–24. (*Some discussion of the role of NGOs and a few mini-case studies.*)